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THE “HAVES” AND “HAVE-NOTS” 
WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION 
ELIZABETH A. HOFFMANN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Marc Galanter’s 1974 groundbreaking article, Why the “Haves” Come Out 
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, and its insightful 
differentiation between legal players1 are crucial components of the foundation 
of law-and-society scholarship. His distinction between “one-shotters,” who use 
the legal system only occasionally and often involuntarily, and the “repeat 
players,” who use the legal system more frequently and strategically,2 highlights 
a key difference between types of litigants. More importantly, it also 
differentiates between the resource-rich, well-positioned “haves,” who are often 
these repeat players, and the resource-poor, more vulnerable “have-nots,” who 
are usually in the role of the one-shotters.3 
Although Galanter’s article focuses on the use of the court system by the 
haves and have-nots, the influence of his analysis extends to research on dispute 
resolution in nonlitigation contexts as well, such as dispute resolution within 
organizations.4 Indeed, as organizations become increasingly legalized,5 asking 
how and whether the haves still “come out ahead” within the semi-legal context 
of organizational grievance-resolution procedures is a logical place of further 
inquiry. When “would-be litigants” are, instead, “would-be grievants,” who 
acts—or does not act—from positions of advantage? 
While the have-nots from Galanter’s article are often envisioned as less-
affluent individual litigants and the haves as wealthy individuals or 
corporations, the composition of these categories varies with different 
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situations.6 In examining the context of employment disputes, rather than 
litigation, one still encounters haves and have-nots—but to discern their 
different statuses, one needs to look closely at what power various workers 
enjoy. 
Although most previous research has considered only the official power of 
employees,7 their unofficial power is also essential in identifying which 
employees are the haves and which are the have-nots. In this article I explore 
the dispute-resolution options of haves and have-nots within organizations by 
comparing the dispute-resolution strategies of workers with great official and 
unofficial power (the haves) and those of workers with little official or 
unofficial power (the have-nots).8 I selected three very different industries, and, 
within each industry, I selected a worker cooperative (nonhierarchical 
workplace where all workers are co-managers and co-owners) and a similar 
conventional, hierarchical business, matched in size and gender ratios: (1) coal 
mining—Coal Co-operative and Valley Colliery; (2) taxicab driving—Co-op 
Cab and Private Taxi; and (3) organic food distribution—Organix Co-op and 
HealthBite Distributors.9 
II 
THE OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL POWER OF THE “HAVES” 
Workers were categorized by the amount of official and unofficial power 
they had, thus creating two operational dichotomies. The haves were workers 
with high official and unofficial power, the “have-somes” were those with high 
official but low unofficial power, and the have-nots had little official or 
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unofficial power.10 No workers were found with high unofficial power but low 
official power—an empirical, not structural, zero. This produced three 
categories for analysis. 
Official power, derived from explicitly stated rights or entitlements, is often 
written down and formally part of the organization. So the inquiry into official 
power began with the various employee handbooks and other documents that 
stated employee privileges, rights, and entitlements within the businesses. 
Rather than take what was “on the books” at face value, inquiries were made to 
ensure that the explicitly stated official power was, in fact, realized.11 Although 
official power is experienced at the individual level, it is rooted in the power 
structure of the organization. Thus, the amount of official power in each 
business was the same for every worker in that organization. Although this 
might not be true in larger businesses with extensive hierarchies, all businesses 
in this study were relatively small (250 employees or fewer), and by including 
only the interviews with the nonmanagerial workers, each business in this study 
evidenced the same level of official power for all of its workers. 
In contrast, unofficial power within the organizations was not always 
uniform since it derived from a number of sources.12 In some businesses, the 
degree of unofficial power varied among individual workers, while in other 
organizations, all employees had similar levels of unofficial power. For example, 
female workers in Co-op Cab, who were a numerical minority, lacked unofficial 
power, even though they held as much official power as their male coworkers. 
They were not part of the established networks of male workers and did not 
have access to much informal information about how the company ran or how 
to circumvent various official rules.13 Unofficial power is not part of the 
organizational structure in that it does not exist independently of personnel, nor 
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the interviewee mentioned some way in which she had unofficial power, or she made no mention of any 
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The inquiries did not reveal any inconsistencies with regard to official power in these organizations. 
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organization, might have knowledge of institutional history (for example, company seniority), or might 
have certain credentials or personal characteristics that provide them with greater influence and confer 
greater authority to their speech. Race, class, and sex often—but not always—mattered. 
 13. See generally Elizabeth A. Hoffmann, Dispute Resolution in a Worker Cooperative: Formal 
Procedures and Procedural Justice, 39 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 51 (2005) for a further discussion of these 
dynamics at Co-op Cab. 
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does it come from an organization’s rules, but rather from workers’ informal, 
personal statuses.14 
III 
POWER AND DISPUTE-RESOLUTION STRATEGIES 
Grievance behavior included four distinct strategies: (1) formal processes—
any disputes resolved through official action; (2) informal processes—similar 
types of disputes, but resolved through negotiation rather than a formal 
procedure; (3) toleration—taking no action to resolve problems, but instead 
developing coping skills or greater tolerance of the problems; and (4) exit—
quitting the job as a way to solve the workplace problem, not merely leaving for 
reasons unrelated to workplace disputes. Although toleration and exit are not 
means for resolving disputes, they are, nevertheless, options for handling 
disputes. The study revealed that the degrees of official and unofficial power 
that individual workers enjoyed greatly affected their dispute-resolution 
strategies. 
This study demonstrates that the amounts of official and unofficial power 
directly affected grievance behaviors. Workers with great official power, as well 
as great unofficial power, relied less on formal grievances, instead preferring 
informal, grievance-resolution strategies. Workers with high official power but 
low unofficial power mostly anticipated using formal grievance-resolution 
mechanisms to address workplace disputes, seldom attempting informal means. 
Workers with little official or unofficial power often did not anticipate resolving 
disputes at all, but rather learned coping skills or simply quit. However, when 
these workers did anticipate addressing their grievances, they were more likely 
to discuss informal over formal means. Below, I examine each of these three 
categories. 
IV 
WORKERS WITH BOTH OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL POWER—THE “HAVES” 
The haves enjoyed the official power derived from their membership and 
ownership in the cooperatives, as well as unofficial power personally enjoyed 
both in the organizations and in greater society that stemmed from their gender, 
class, race, and implementation of an egalitarian ideology. This haves group 
 
 14. To gauge unofficial power, individual workers were asked about the informal resources 
available to them, such as access to information about the company. Workers cited most by 
interviewees as people from whom they would seek assistance were also noted. The investigation of 
unofficial power examined both organizational and individual components, because unofficial power 
involves the organizational level as well as the individual level. The organizational level was not 
analyzed simply as an aggregate of the power of the individual workers, but as part of the 
organizational structure and culture. Although the actual dispute-resolution strategies—the precise 
focus of this study—are caused by individual-level power, this relationship cannot be understood 
without also studying the organizational structure and culture. Individuals’ dispute-resolution styles 
emerge from the culture and structure of their organizations in that the organizations’ structure and 
culture affect the individuals’ amounts of power. 
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includes all of the miners from Coal Co-operative as well as some members 
from Co-op Cab and Organix Co-op. Additionally, at Coal Co-operative, 
workers also gained substantial unofficial power through the implementation of 
the cooperative ideology; thus, at this company, all the workers had a 
substantial amount of unofficial power. 
In contrast, white men from any background at Co-op Cab and middle-class 
white people (for example, with university degrees and middle-class accents15) at 
Organix Co-op16 enjoyed greater unofficial power. Compared to their coworkers 
who lacked unofficial power, these haves enjoyed greater closeness with 
worker–managers, greater access to information, usually longer tenure, and 
more institutional knowledge—all of which enabled them to resolve more 
grievances informally. 
Workers with great official and unofficial power seldom listed formal 
grievance resolution among their dispute-resolution strategies. The miners at 
Coal Co-operative were those who were the most likely of this group to 
consider formal resolution—specifically, forty-six percent of the miners 
mentioned formal grievances. Notably, after the conversion of the coal mine to 
a worker cooperative, the miners were able to bring additional formal 
grievances on certain topics that they were not able to raise previously. One 
electrician, for example, spoke of how issues that would have been deemed not 
sufficiently important to bring as a formal grievance when the mine was run by 
British Coal were acceptable to be raised in the cooperative. He described a 
formal grievance about the toilet paper brought soon after the mine reopened 
as a cooperative. 
Another thing they wanted changed when we came back as a co-operative was the 
toilet paper. The toilet paper [the miners used], they were the old government bloody 
thick paper. A simple thing like that. And the managers, under British Coal, their 
toilets up there, they had the soft, bloody soft, pink paper.17 
However, only nine percent of the workers at Co-op Cab or Organix Co-op 
listed formal grievances as one of their dispute-resolution strategies. For these 
haves—and for the majority at Coal Co-op as well—their heightened unofficial 
power enabled them to opt to not exercise their right to formal grievances and, 
instead, resolve their grievances informally. Informal grievance resolution is a 
more subtle use of power that circumvents much of the public debate inevitable 
with formal grievances. One middle-class member of the Organix Co-op 
reflected on this, describing how informal processes often worked: 
 
 15. Most people with university degrees also had middle-class accents, usually signified as a 
Southern or London accent. Organix Co-op was located in a working-class area in the North of 
England, where members drawn from the local population did not have a higher education and did 
have a northern, working-class accent. 
 16. Men as well as women at Organix Co-op comprised this group with both official and unofficial 
power. Unlike Co-op Cab, where women were only fifteen percent of the workforce, Organix Co-op 
had an even number of men and women workers. 
 17. Interview with Interviewee #129, Coal Co-operative, in S. Wales, U.K. (Feb. 1997). 
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I actually find that these formal procedures that we go through [are] much less divisive 
than the informal ones. The informal ones tend to arrive at a kind of consensus that 
nobody fully understands. . . . There are no committee meetings: they’re informal, you 
know, passing through the corridor, and having a word, and saying, “What do you 
think about so-and-so.” They happen to be in groups of, maybe, two. Then those two 
go and meet another two, and so on. So they’re not transparent, and I find that rather 
bad and undermining of the [cooperative] principles.18 
He believed that informal dispute resolution privileged those with sufficient 
unofficial power, often affecting the resolution process without overt 
manipulations and with hidden influence. This covert nature makes such 
informal actions both very powerful and difficult to identify and counter. 
Very few people—under ten percent at each company—with both unofficial 
as well as official power at Organix, Co-op Cab, and Coal Co-operative spoke 
of toleration or “lumping it,” to use Galanter’s phrase.19 Additionally, only 
twelve percent of the workers at Organix and Co-op Cab, collectively, 
mentioned quitting as a way to deal with would-be grievances. 
At Coal Co-operative, no one raised this as a possible strategy. This could 
be tied to workers’ concerns over preserving their jobs and keeping the mine 
open, since many deep-pit mines in the United Kingdom had already been 
closed. Because the workers saw the jobs at Coal Co-operative as precious 
commodities, jobs they had to work together to create and even financially to 
buy into, it is not surprising that no one mentioned leaving. Nor, however, 
despite the scarcity of good jobs, did workers discuss a willingness to tolerate 
problems or grievous situations in order to hold on to their positions. This 
absence of toleration-talk could reflect that workers were so grateful for their 
jobs that they did not notice otherwise-problematic situations, or that workers 
had sufficient success with their dispute-resolution strategies that they could 
resolve problems rather than tolerate them. Although the data do not support 
one explanation over the other, either explanation is noteworthy. 
V 
WORKERS WITH ONLY OFFICIAL POWER—THE “HAVE-SOMES” 
All members of Valley Colliery, Organix Co-op, and Co-op Cab had high 
official power. Although at Valley this power derived primarily from the strong 
mining unions, at Organix and Co-op Cab, official power came from the rules of 
the cooperatives. However, unlike Valley Colliery, where unofficial power was 
uniformly low among all workers, at Organix Co-op and Co-op Cab, some 
workers had low unofficial power—enjoying only official power—while others 
had high unofficial power—giving them both official and unofficial power.20 The 
members with less unofficial power were generally women and people of color 
at Co-op Cab and the less-educated, nonwhite, or working-class members at 
 
 18. Interview with Interviewee #099, Organix Co-op, in N. England, U.K. (Nov. 1996). 
 19. Galanter, supra note 1, at 124–25. 
 20. See discussion supra Part IV. 
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Organix Co-op.21 They were less likely to mention informal grievance strategies, 
instead favoring formal processes, toleration, or exit. 
This first group of have-somes—those without unofficial power—spoke 
proudly of their ability to bring formal grievances (ninety-two percent). They 
felt that having a realistic and usable formal grievance system was, in itself, very 
important. Many members at Organix Co-op and Co-op Cab explained that a 
key advantage of worker cooperatives was that formal grievances were more 
socially acceptable and easier to raise. For the miners at Valley Colliery, their 
commitment to formal grievance resolution was tied to their membership in the 
National Union of Miners (NUM), which protected its members from 
management retaliation over grievances and created a work atmosphere that 
validated the bringing of formal grievances as appropriate actions. 
Sometimes these workers who lacked great unofficial power preferred 
resolving even apparently simple disputes formally. For example, one member 
from the working-class community of Organix’s new location22 described a 
grievance he had brought that others with unofficial power might have been 
able to resolve informally. 
My relationship with the department was suffering and I thought that I couldn’t get on 
with my job, so I took the whole of the department to grievance. It turned out that 
there was something available to me in terms of information or the way my job could 
be done to work better. So we worked it out quite well.23 
If this worker had had sufficient unofficial power to locate the information 
he mentions or to demand the assistance and attention of his department 
informally, a formal grievance might not have been necessary.  
Even those workers who did not anticipate success with the formal 
grievance procedure believed that their only option was to raise formal 
grievances. For example, a woman at Co-op Cab described several decisions by 
worker–managers that she felt were blatantly unjust. She explained that, 
although she did not think her odds of winning a formal grievance were good, 
the formal grievance procedure was the only route available to her. 
I have a temper. They [two worker–managers] were hoping I’d lose my temper and 
tell them to stick the place up their ass and quit. Each time I haven’t done that. I’ve 
gone through their [grievance] process no matter how much I knew that the odds were 
against me. Sometimes I win.24 
For these workers, formal grievance resolution was their sole way to resolve 
a dispute. Therefore, they reported being more likely to resolve grievances 
formally, even when they had minimal faith in the formal grievance procedures. 
 
 21. Although it is interesting that the two different worker cooperatives privileged different 
societal statuses, the particular statuses that conferred unofficial power—gender, class, and race—are 
not surprising. Female, working class, and nonwhite people throughout society generally experience 
less power. 
 22. Organix Co-op’s previous location had been in a college town and Organix employed many 
graduates from the large university there. It moved to a formerly industrial, now economically 
depressed, working-class town. 
 23. Interview with Interviewee #145, Organix Co-op, in N. England, U.K. (Nov. 1996). 
 24. Interview with Interviewee #174, Co-op Cab, in Midwest, U.S. (Mar. 1994). 
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In contrast to the statements of workers with high unofficial power, these 
workers usually did not see informal grievance resolution as a viable option. Of 
those with little or no unofficial power, only thirteen percent considered 
informal dispute resolution. Although their membership in the cooperatives 
gave them official power, enabling them to raise formal grievances, they lacked 
the unofficial power to also have the option of informal grievance resolution. 
For example, the speaker below was a white man, who had left school at age 
sixteen. He had joined Organix Co-op two years before being interviewed. He 
was very conscious of his strong, Northern England, working-class accent and 
was somewhat intimidated by coworkers who he felt were better educated than 
he was. 
Some people can get things done by just talking to other people. If there’s a problem, 
they can get it solved quick. They’re smart and know about things. They can make 
new things happen fast. . . . They’re well-educated. They don’t talk like I do [with a 
northern, working-class accent]. . . . But that’s them. Who listens to me? 
But that’s alright. That’s why this is a co-op. If I have a problem, I can bring it up, 
either go to [my section’s grievance officer] or put it on the agenda at a meeting. I 
don’t have to [informally] speak to a bunch of people, because I can just raise it 
[through formal procedures].25 
His statement provides a good description of how successful, informal 
grievance resolution was only an option for those members with more unofficial 
power. 
Additionally, some workers (fifteen percent) with little or no unofficial 
power spoke about coping mechanisms. For example, at Organix Co-op, a Sikh 
worker who identified himself as Black, having been born in Pakistan and 
raised in a working-class, Northern England town, felt that neither formal nor 
informal grievance resolution were successful options for him. Below, he 
described an incident in which a coworker offended him by deliberately flipping 
off his head-covering. This time he did bring a formal grievance, but he felt that 
nothing was done. He asserted that he is usually able to tolerate racist and other 
offensive behavior because he is strong as an individual. If he cannot get 
satisfaction when he asserts himself against offensive behavior, he is strong 
enough to tolerate the circumstances. 
From my sector, like Asia or Pakistan, I’m the only one who has lasted [at the 
company]. Once an incident actually happened where I felt quite abused. I was 
wearing a cap, not my turban. I still believe [the coworker] would know [that this cap 
counted as a head-covering]. And [the coworker] walked past and he just flipped my 
hat off and it fell on the floor. I was really, really fuming. People know who I am or 
that my beliefs are that way. I don’t have to tell anybody. I brought [a grievance], but 
nothing actually happened. 
What do you do then? 
What do I do?  I’d just grit my teeth and just get on with life.26 
 
 25. Interview with Interviewee #164, Organix Co-op, in N. England, U.K. (Nov. 1996). 
 26. Interview with Interviewee #093, Organix Co-op, in N. England, U.K. (Nov. 1996). 
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Frustration with grievance resolution, either formal or informal, meant that 
these workers had learned to tolerate problems. 
Those who could neither tolerate disputes nor resolve them formally or 
informally would eventually leave. Of the workers at the cooperatives, few 
workers (nine percent) who had only official power considered quitting as a 
means of dealing with disputes. Again, these tended to be workers who faced 
societal oppression based on more than a single, disempowered status, such as 
race or class or gender alone. For example, a driver at Co-op Cab described the 
racism-based grievance of a young African American woman which resulted in 
her leaving the cooperative. 
We’ve had very few Black women working for us over the years. [The particular 
woman] would have racial incidents with customers and not be backed properly. For 
example, in general, if there’s a customer you’re having a particular problem with, for 
whatever reason, you turn down their call. You don’t pick them up. 
In this particular instance, it was a customer who was an old, white lady who needed 
assistance to and from the cab. She would have to lean on my friend and while she was 
doing that she would whisper under her breath, “f*cking n*gger.” And so my friend 
one day tried to refuse to get the call. The dispatcher said, “Go get the call.” She said, 
“I won’t pick that person up.” He said, “Why not.” And she said, “Because the woman 
calls me a n*gger.” He came back and said, “Just get the call.” She came back [to the 
main office] and said, “F*ck you,” and walked [quit].27 
At Valley Colliery, as at Coal Co-operative, no one mentioned leaving as a 
way to address grievances, most likely for similar reasons.28 
VI 
WORKERS WHO HELD LITTLE  
OFFICIAL OR UNOFFICIAL POWER—THE “HAVE-NOTS” 
Employees at HealthBite and Private Taxi, two of the hierarchical 
businesses, had the least workplace power—little official power or unofficial 
power—of all the sites studied here. They did not have the advocacy and 
empowerment of union membership, the democratic managerial rights of 
worker ownership, or the job protection provided by either. Although both 
Private Taxi and HealthBite had formal grievance procedures, employees rarely 
used them. Only fourteen percent of employees at Private Taxi and no one at 
HealthBite used or anticipated using formal grievance resolution. Workers at 
these businesses lacked the official power to bring formal grievances through 
the internal, formal grievance procedures. With information-dissemination 
through neither co-op membership nor union-education efforts (as occurred in 
the other businesses),29 employees at HealthBite and Private Taxi lacked the 
empowerment necessary to use the available grievance procedures. Those few 
employees who did feel confident in their ability to bring formal grievances 
 
 27. Interview with Interviewee #011, Co-op Cab, in Midwest, U.S. (Oct. 1993). 
 28. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 29. See discussion supra Parts IV–V. 
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nevertheless disfavored formal grievances—whether because there was no 
assurance that using a formal grievance would not provoke retaliation or for 
personal strategic reasons. 
Because employees at HealthBite and Private Taxi did not believe that 
formal grievance resolution was a realistic option, they turned to informal 
means to resolve grievances, learned to tolerate would-be grievances, or quit 
their jobs entirely. Fifty-six percent of the employees at HealthBite and forty-
three percent of those at Private Taxi said that they would try to resolve their 
grievances informally. A driver from Private Taxi explained that people try 
whatever means they can, with whomever they can, when they attempt to 
resolve grievances through informal means. 
Everyone goes to whoever they think they’re gonna get some satisfaction from. If 
someone has a good relationship with [the owner], then they’ll probably go to [him] 
and see what they can do. If someone has a good relationship with [the manager], at 
this point in time, they’ll go to [him] to see what they can do. In some cases, people 
will go to the dispatcher and say, “Hey, you know, listen, I got this problem with this 
guy that’s doing this other shift, and I feel like he’s screwed me over. Or whatever.”30 
This quotation illustrates that, when these employees did attempt to resolve 
their workplace disputes, grievance resolution for the employees at HealthBite 
and Private Taxi was most likely to be informal. They simply did not see formal 
resolution as an option. 
But even informal grievance resolution was not a consideration for all 
employees at HealthBite and Private Taxi. Many employees—sixty-one percent 
of those interviewed at HealthBite and thirty-six percent at Private Taxi—
discussed the grievance strategy of learning to tolerate what could be potential 
grievances. This “lumping it” was sometimes done quietly and accepted and 
other times done while complaining to others. For example, an employee at 
HealthBite, whose response is typical of many from HealthBite and Private 
Taxi, explained that often his preferred path is to do nothing. 
If someone else isn’t doing their work and I’m doing it all, what I’ve learned in the 
past, is to just shut your mouth and keep doing it. ‘Cause that’s how it works. I just 
shut up and keep doing it.31 
These have-not employees had developed various ways to cope with 
problems they could not or would not resolve. Their ability to “lump it” allowed 
them to avoid any sort of grievance resolution without leaving their jobs. 
Yet some employees did mention quitting their jobs, both as the ultimate 
solution to a dispute and as an initial response. At HealthBite, seventeen 
percent of those interviewed said that they would leave the company as a way to 
resolve a dispute; at Private Taxi, thirty-six percent—the same percentage that 
mentioned toleration at this company—said they would leave to resolve a 
problem. For example, a thirty-year-old woman explained, as did others, that 
 
 30. Interview with Interviewee #063, Private Taxi, in Midwest, U.S. (Nov. 1997). 
 31. Interview with Interviewee #059, HealthBite, in London, U.K. (Apr. 1997). 
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quitting was an easy option if employees found themselves unhappy at their 
jobs. 
What I’m getting here, I know I could get in another job. I can go to an agency and get 
another job. So I’m not fighting for a career here. It’s just a casual job and I’m not 
gonna fight to keep it. If there was something I really couldn’t stand, then I would 
move on.32 
Thus, while many people at both HealthBite and Private Taxi spoke of 
enjoying their work, some felt so tied to their companies that they would stay in 
their jobs if they had disputes they could not resolve or tolerate. 
VII 
THE “HAVES” COMING OUT AHEAD 
These observations of official and unofficial power illustrate and confirm 
Galanter’s thesis regarding the haves and the have-nots.33 However, in the 
conceptualization in this study, to be truly advantaged and to enjoy fully 
workplace-dispute-resolution advantages, one must be a have with regard to 
both official and unofficial power. This article demonstrates the link between 
dispute-resolution strategies and the amount of official and unofficial power 
held by individual workers. The have-somes—those with official power only—
were able to utilize the formal procedures offered by their businesses. They 
often saw themselves as empowered to raise grievances and so make their 
voices heard in the disputing arena. They compared themselves—either 
explicitly or implicitly—with those have-nots who lacked official (and 
unofficial) power. Accordingly, the have-somes perceived themselves as more 
able to address their workplace grievances than the have-nots, who more often 
learned to cope or who chose to exit. The haves of both official and unofficial 
power exercised their power by not resorting to formal grievances. They saw 
themselves as able to stand apart from the inefficiency and public spectacle of 
using formal procedures to address their grievances. Instead, they had sufficient 
power—official and unofficial power—to resolve grievances more casually. 
Thus, these data do not imply a simple, monotonic relationship between 
power and formal grievance resolution. They demonstrate the disinclination 
toward using formal grievances by workers with the most power. Those who 
have the option of successful grievance resolution through informal, dispute-
resolution strategies will often opt for those informal means, rather than use 
formal grievance procedures—thus circumventing the various costs of formal 
grievance resolution altogether. 
This echoes Galanter’s findings that the more powerful haves will use the 
formal court system strategically—pursuing only the select few that they are 
most likely to win or that will change the rules of the game in a way favorable to 
 
 32. Interview with Interviewee #159, Private Taxi, in London, U.K. (Apr. 1997). 
 33. Galanter, supra note 1, at 124 (noting that the have-nots tend to come out ahead because of 
advantages available to them in different dispute-settlement contexts). 
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the haves and settling riskier cases or those that will not make strong 
precedents.34 The greatest haves in the study—those with high official and 
unofficial power—seldom used the formal grievance procedures at their 
workplaces; but, when they did, they used them very deliberately and for 
specific purposes. These workers rallied to the formal grievance procedures 
only when they believed they would be unsuccessful at resolving the issue 
informally or when they wanted to utilize the public nature of the formal 
grievance forum. 
Yet workers had to have sufficient “have-status” to have the option of 
engaging in formal dispute resolution at all. To consider the formal grievance 
procedures, workers had to at least be in the have-somes category. Even if these 
formal procedures were their only means for dispute resolution, they were still 
better off than the have-nots with even more limited options. 
A number of structural factors contributed to the advantaged status of the 
haves. The haves, who possessed both official and unofficial power, were more 
likely to be male, college-educated, white, and of middle-class background. 
Additionally, both the have-somes and the full haves were more likely to be 
members of worker cooperatives, co-owning and co-running their own 
workplaces. 
Finally, one must acknowledge that—in any study of dispute resolution and 
the workplace—management is the ultimate have in the employment-dispute 
context. Although this study did not look specifically at the power of 
management vis-à-vis workers, the advantages of the repeat-player 
management are evident. Unlike an individual one-shotter disputant, 
management can structure the employment relationship to put itself in the most 
advantageous position in the event of a dispute. When a dispute does arise, 
management is more able to play for long-run, strategic interests. Additionally, 
management has greater familiarity with the grievance process and the rules of 
the company, and so has fewer “start-up costs” in responding to an employee’s 
grievance. 
Thus, the haves do still “come out ahead” within the workplace-dispute-
resolution context. Those with more power have more dispute-resolution 
strategies at their disposal. The have-nots are left more vulnerable and more 
likely to feel forced to quit their jobs or to succumb to silent toleration when 
they are powerless to resolve their workplace grievances. 
 34. Galanter, supra note 1, at 97–103. 
